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AUG 1 9 2002 
Pautette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
M A R K L. S H U R T L E F F 
ATTORNEY GENERAL __ 
~ ' KIRK TORGENSEN 
RAY HlNTZE Chief Deputy Criminal 
Chief Deputy Civil 
August 19,2002 
PAULETTE STAGG 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: State of Utah v. Alvie Grover, Case No. 20010262-CA 
Dear Ms. Stagg, 
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. After the 
State filed its brief on April 18, 2002, counsel discovered State v. Visser, 2001 UT App 
215, 31 P.3d 584, which is relevant to defendant's due process and competency claim. 
See Aplt. Br. at 5-8; Aple. Br. at 9-14. A copy of Visser is attached for your convenience. 
Respectfully submitted, 
<REY T. COLEMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
encl. 
cc: Margaret P. Lindsay, Attorney for Appellant 
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H 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Appellee, 
v. 
Brad VISSER, Appellant. 
No. 971760-CA. 
July 6, 2001. 
Rehearing Denied July 30, 2001. 
Certiorari Denied Sept. 10, 2001. 
Defendant who pled guilty to rape during trial 
brought motion to withdraw guilty plea. The 
District Court, San Juan County, Lyie R. Anderson, 
J., denied defendant's motion, and defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 973 P.2d 998, 
reversed, and state filed petition for writ of 
certiorari. The Supreme Court, Durrant, J., 22 P.3d 
1242, reversed and remanded. The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, P.J., held that: (1) defendant 
was competent to enter plea; (2) defendant was not 
denied effective assistance of counsel; and (3) 
defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Criminal Law C=*1149 
110k 1149 Most Cited Cases 
[1] Criminal Law € = n 158(1) 
1 lOkl 158(1) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of 
discretion standard, incorporating the clearly 
erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of 
fact made in conjunction with that decision. 
[2] Criminal Law € = n 134(8) 
1 lOkl 134(8) Most Cited Cases 
Question of whether the trial court strictly complied 
with constitutional and procedural requirements for 
entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. 
Copr. © West 2002 No 
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[3] Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present a 
mixed question of law and fact. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
[4] Criminal Law €=>273(2) 
110k273(2) Most Cited Cases 
When determining whether a defendant is 
competent to plead guilty, the trial court must 
consider whether the defendant has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding and has 
a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him. 
[5] Criminal Law €=*i 158(1) 
110k 1158(1) Most Cited Cases 
To the extent that findings of fact are based on a 
determination of credibility, Court of Appeals 
defers to the trial court. 
[6] Criminal Law €=>273(2) 
110k273(2) Most Cited Cases 
Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant 
was competent to enter guilty plea to rape; 
defendant was provided with an adequate 
explanation of the charges and his choices, 
defendant was given time to deliberate on his own, 
Xanax and Hydrocodone had worn off by the time 
defendant entered plea, taking of Ritalin had 
discounted any Attention Deficit Disorder problem, 
and trial court found that defendant's alleged 
confusion, ignorance and lack of understanding at 
hearing to withdraw plea was feigned. 
[71 Criminal Law €^641.13(5) 
110k641.13(5) Most Cited Cases 
Counsel's performance in urging defendant to plead 
guilty to rape during trial was not deficient, where 
two of defendant's key witnesses refused to testify, 
and victim denied writing note that counsel hoped 
to use for impeachment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
[8] Constitutional Law €=^265.5 
92k265.5 Most Cited Cases 
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(81 Criminal Law €=>273.1(4) 
110k273 1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's right to due process was not violated at 
the taking of his guilty plea to rape, although 
defendant was under extreme pressure which was 
exacerbated by his youth and medical problems, 
counsel made fervent attempts to advise defendant 
of his options U S C A Const Amend 14 
*584 Margaret H Olson, Hobbs & Adonkakis, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Joanne C 
Slotnik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
*585 Before GREENWOOD, PJ, and BENCH, 
and ORME, JJ 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Presidmg Judge: 
f 1 We decide this case on remand from the Utah 
Supreme Court. Defendant contends he was 
incompetent to enter a guilty plea, received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and was deprived 
of his right to due process at the taking of his guilty 
plea We affirm 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 The more detailed facts are set forth in State v 
Visser 1999 UT App 019, 973 P 2d 998 {Visser /), 
and State v Visser, 2000 UT 88, 408 Utah Adv. 
Rep 9, 22 P3d 1242 (Visser II). We reiterate only 
the facts relevant to the issues addressed in this 
appeal 
H 3 On October 16, 1996, the State charged 
defendant with Aggravated Sexual Assault of a 
sixteen-year-old girl. Aggravated Sexual Assault is 
a first degree felony carrying a minimum mandatory 
sentence Defendant was seventeen years old at the 
tune of the alleged incident. The prosecutor 
offered defendant a plea bargain, in which the 
prosecutor would agree not to charge defendant as 
an adult and would recommend defendant 
participate in counseling rather than be subject to 
any lockup or incarceration, in exchange for 
Copr © West 2002 No Claim 
Page 2 
defendant's guilty plea to a first degree felony 
Contrary to the advice of his attorney, defendant 
refused the plea bargain After a preliminary 
heanng held in the juvenile court, defendant was 
charged as an adult and bound over to the district 
court pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act 
See Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-602 (1996) 
Defendant continued to refuse the prosecutor's 
subsequent plea offers. 
1 4 On the eve of trial, two of defendant's key 
witnesses refused to testify In addition, at trial, the 
victim denied writing a note that defendant alleged 
she authored and that defense counsel had hoped to 
use for impeachment. After the victim denied 
authonng the note, defendant's trial counsel 
abruptly called for a recess, during which he urged 
defendant to plead guilty to Rape Trial counsel was 
adamant that the trial was going badly and told 
defendant he believed defendant stood a very high 
chance of being convicted of Aggravated Sexual 
Assault, which earned a minimum mandatory pnson 
term. Tnal counsel explained the difference in 
sentencing between Aggravated Sexual Assault and 
Rape, and strongly urged defendant to plead guilty 
to Rape Defendant was very upset, as were his 
family members. However, after asking some 
questions and requesting some time alone to 
consider the plea, defendant decided to accept it. 
U 5 Following this one hour recess, the tnal court 
conducted a detailed plea colloquy, and defendant 
pleaded guilty to Rape, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1995) 
Before sentencing, however, defendant fired his 
tnal counsel, engaged new counsel, and timely 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea After a hearing 
on August 8, 1997, at which both defendant and his 
tnal counsel testified, the tnal court entered 
findings of fact and denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. 
f 6 Defendant then appealed In Visser I, we held 
that the tnal court exceeded its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion for a new tnal because 
the colloquy was inadequate under Rule 11 We 
remanded the case for fiirther proceedmgs, but did 
not reach the remaining issues raised by defendant 
on appeal See Visser I, 973 P 2d 998, 1999 UT 
App 019 at f 20 Thereafter, the Utah Supreme 
Court granted certioran, see State v Visser, 982 
P 2d 87, and in Visser II, reversed our holding in 
Ong U S Govt Works 
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Visser I and remanded to this com: t. See Visser II 
22 P.3d 1242, 2000 UT 88 at 1 17. As instructed 
by the supreme court, we now address "the other 
issues Visser raised before [us in Visser / ] . " Id. 
Specifically, we consider defendant's claims that he 
was not competent to enter a guilty plea, that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that 
the taking of the guilty plea deprived him of ins 
right to due process. 
ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] 1| 7 Defendant claims lie was incompetent 
to enter a plea of guilty the afternoon *586 of June 
23, 1997. "We review a tnal court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 'abuse of 
discretion' standard, incorporating the 'clearly 
erroneous' standard for the trial court's findings of 
fact made in conjunction with that decision." State 
v Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (citation 
'•fitted). "However, the ultimate question of 
:he trial court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry 
of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed 
for correctness " Id. 
[ij •„ . defendant also claims he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
"Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present a 
mixed question of law and fact." Parsons v. Barnes, 
871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994). We review 
questions of law for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions. See id. 
However, when reviewing questions of fact, we 
defer to the tnal court's findings and do not set them 
aside unless clearly erroneous. See id, 
1} 9 Last, defendant contends that the trial court's 
taking of the guilty plea deprived him of his right to 
due process because he did not enter the guilty plea 
knowingly and voluntarily. "Whether the district 
court strictly complied with constitutional and 
procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness." State 
v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,1 14, 414 I Itah Adv. 
Rep. 51. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Competency 
* ;Q Defendant contends he was incompetent to 
enter the guilty plea. Defendant's arguments are 
I i . p .'i W t M , ' 0 0 ' N i t ( 
Pase 3 
based, in large part, on his affidavit and testimony. 
He argues he was experiencing severe stress that 
impaired his ability to understand what was 
happening, suffered from Attention Deficit 
Disorder, and was taking prescription medication. 
This information was presented at the hearing on 
defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The 
State argues the trial court's findings and the record 
support the trial court's determination that defendant 
was competent. 
[4] 1 11 Both parties cite State v. Holland,. 921 
P.2d 430 (Utah 1996), for the applicable standard. 
As Holland states, when "determining whether a 
defendant is competent to plead guilty, the trial 
court must consider 'whether the defendant has 
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" 
and has a "rational as well as factual understanding" 
of the proceedings against him.' " Id, at 433 
(citations omitted). In the present case, the trial 
court observed defendant at both the tnal and 
during the subsequent hearing. The trial court also 
heard testimony from defendant's trial counsel. 
The court then entered findings of fact: 
5. The Court finds the defendant to not be 
credible. 
6. Regarding [defendant's] testimony, the Court 
finds that on several incidents [defendant] was 
pretending, pretending confusion, pretending 
ignorance, pretending lack of understanding. 
The Court finds that he understood the 
proceedings much better than he conceded in his 
testimony on August 8. 
16. The Court finds that [defense counsel] was 
given the time he needed to assess the case and 
discuss the case with his client. 
17. The Court finds that [defendant] was given an 
opportunity to makehis own choice, to deliberate 
on his own. 
18. The Court finds that maybe for the first time 
in the conduct of 'the case, [defendant] made his 
own decision on this matter. 
19. The Court finds that [defendant] was 
provided with an adequate explanation of the 
choices before him, of the charges he was facing 
and of the elements of the offense. 
20. The Court finds that the medk.; •• 
play a factor in this case. 
21. The Court finds that the Xanax and 
Hydrocodone had worn, off by the time that 
to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works 
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[defendant] was making his determination to 
plead. 
22. The Court further finds that [defendant] had 
taken his Ritalin, which discounts *587 any 
Attention Deficit Disorder problem. 
23. The Court finds that the Ritalin helped 
[defendant]. 
Further, in a subsequent order, the trial court 
stated it had no doubt "that defendant fully 
understood his options and made a knowingf,] 
voluntary decision to plead guilty." The trial court 
found that although defendant's counsel was 
"strongly encouraging" defendant to take the plea 
offer, defendant "still had enough control and 
presence of mind to ask for time to consider the 
decision by himself." Defendant at that time had 
been told by counsel what the differences in 
sentencing would be if he were found guilty, 
vis-a-vis, if he took the plea offer. After defendant 
decided to take the offer, he told the court the 
decision was "entirely" his own. 
[5][6] f 12 To the extent that findings of fact are 
based on a determination of credibility, we defer to 
the trial court. See Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P,2d 
785, 790 (Utah Ct.App.1997). The trial court has 
the responsibility to determine the credibility of 
testimony. "A trial court's factual findings 
[regarding defendant's competency] will not be 
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous." State 
v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19,f 45, 415 
Utah Adv. Rep. 29. "We give deference to the trial 
court's factual findings because of its superior 
position to assess credibility." Id. In the present 
case, "there was ample evidence to support the trial 
court's finding of competency," id. at % 51, and we 
defer to that decision. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
f 13 Defendant contends that his trial counsel's 
plan to convince him to plead guilty if the case 
eroded was improper and that counsel put his own 
personal problems above his client's needs. The 
State relies on the trial court's findings of fact and 
case law to defeat this claim of error. 
f 14 To prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, defendant must establish (1) 
that his trial counsel's performance was "deficient," 
and (2) that he was "prejudiced" by the ineffective 
assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
Copr. © West 2002 No < 
Page 4 
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
A counsel's assistance is deficient when a 
defendant "showfs] that ... [it] fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688, 
104 S.Ct. at 2064. "The proper measure of attorney 
performance remains simply reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms." Id. In determining 
whether "counsel's performance was deficient, we 
must 'indulge in the strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that 
under the circumstances, the challenged action 
"might be considered sound trial strategy." ' " State 
v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 
2065 (citation omitted)). 
[7] % 15 Defendant has failed to establish that his 
trial counsel's performance was deficient; thus, we 
do not consider whether defendant was prejudiced 
by his counsel's performance. 
1 16 As noted, the trial court made extensive 
findings regarding defendant's competency and his 
understanding of the proceedings. The trial court 
also found that defendant "had effective assistance 
of counsel," after having observed counsel perform 
throughout the proceedings, including the trial and 
hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
Further, it was a legitimate strategy for defendant's 
counsel to try to convince defendant to plead when 
the case essentially eroded. See Odle v. State, 241 
So.2d 184, 185-86 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1970) 
(rejecting defendant's argument that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel when counsel 
"considered it better trial strategy to enter a plea of 
guilty"). Under the circumstances of this case, 
defense counsel's vehemence in urging defendant to 
accept a plea bargain is understandable. Indeed, 
from the outset, counsel appreciated the advisability 
of a plea bargain in this case, and only defendant's 
recalcitrance, against the advice of counsel, kept 
defendant from receiving a very light sentence in 
juvenile court. Thus, we are *588 not persuaded 
that defendant has overcome the presumption of 
sound trial strategy. 
C. Due Process 
% 17 Defendant contends that his right to due 
process was violated at the taking of the guilty plea. 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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See U.S. Const, amend. V. In making this 
argument, defendant relies to a great extent on his 
argument of claimed inadequacies during the plea 
colloquy under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The supreme court disposed 
of defendant's Rule 11 argument in Visser //, but 
did not address defendant's distinct due process 
claim that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. 
[8] f 18 Defendant argues that we should look at 
the entire proceedings to determine whether he was 
deprived of his right to due process. Defendant 
contends he was under extreme pressure from his 
family and his counsel, and this pressure was 
exacerbated by his youth and medical problems. 
As a result, defendant contends his guilty plea could 
not have been knowing and voluntary. We 
acknowledge the extreme stress of defendant's 
situation, but nevertheless conclude that defendant 
was not denied fundamental fairness, given the trial 
court's findings at the hearing on the motion to 
withdraw and trial counsel's fervent attempts to 
advise his client of options available to him. 
CONCLUSION 
1 19 We defer to the trial court's finding that 
defendant was competent to enter the guilty plea. 
Defendant's trial counsel's efforts to have defendant 
plead when the case eroded was a legitimate trial 
strategy and did not amount to ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Finally, defendant entered the plea 
knowingly and voluntarily; therefore, we find no 
violation of his right to due process. 
f 20 Affirmed. 
f 21 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Judge, GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
31 P.3d 584, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2001 UT App 
215 
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